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Abstract 
 
In two papers in the mid-seventies, Quine has discussed an ontological deba-
cle, the reduction of ontology to an ontology of pure sets only. This debacle, 
which weakened Quine’s interest in ontology, is the natural outcome of on-
tological relativity, or, more precisely, the proxy-function argument. It is ex-
plained how Quine unavoidably came to this conclusion. Moreover, it is ar-
gued that the result is even more damaging for Quine’s philosophy than has 
hitherto been assumed. It is shown that in addition to an ontological debacle, 
there is an ideological debacle, reducing the ideology (lexicon) of science to 
the ideology of set theory. The ideological debacle results from applying ex-
tensional substitution of predicates within a scientific theory that is reinter-
preted by means of proxy-functions to a theory with a set-theoretic ontology. 
Though Quine has recognized the possibility of an ideological debacle, his 
rebuttal is unconvincing. As a result, his tenet of extensionalism is under 
heavy pressure.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this article I will explain an unwelcome result of Quine’s thesis of 
ontological relativity. I will claim that a combination of some of 
Quine’s central philosophical tenets leads to a situation where the 
whole of science collapses to set theory, not only at an ontological 
level, but also at the level of the ideology. I will analyse a scenario that 
Quine worked out in the mid-seventies, which he called an ontological 
debacle. I will conclude that Quine should also accept that this leads 
to what I have called an ideological debacle. 
The term ideology may strike the reader as odd. While Quine’s no-
tion of ontology is well-known, his notion of ideology is seldom re-
ferred to.1 Everybody knows more or less what Quine’s means by the 
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word ‘ontology’; it concerns the study of what there is. It concerns the 
values of our variables, and these are the objects in our universe. In 
1951 Quine wrote a brief article, “Ontology and ideology.” In addition 
to ontology, the word ideology was introduced as the study of ideas, 
expressed in the predicates of our language. Quine also uses the two 
words in another sense. One can speak of the ontology of a theory, the 
collection of the values of the variables the theory is committed to. 
The ideology of a theory is the list of predicates of the theory. One can 
show that there is a subtle interplay between ontology and ideology in 
Quine’s philosophy.2 I will present here one dramatic consequence of 
Quine’s construction. It will be shown that the ontology of science 
consists of pure sets only, i.e. sets that are formed by means of the 
empty set, pairing, taking power sets and replacement. I will argue, and 
this is something Quine tried to avoid, that also the ideology of science 
might be replaced by a lexicon of set-theoretical predicates only. The 
whole of science then is reduced to set theory. This argument jeopard-
ises Quine’s broad use of the tenet of extensionalism.  
I will give the argument in a few steps. In the next section, I will 
briefly present Quine’s inscrutability of reference, which forms the ba-
sis of my argument. I will distinguish two Quinean arguments. The first 
and most famous argument from Word and Object is based on the inde-
terminacy of translation. The second argument is based on proxy func-
tions, and will be the most relevant one for the rest of the paper. In 
the third section I will then illustrate how Quine, after having lost 
faith in ontology at the end of the sixties, presented an ‘ontological 
debacle’ in two papers in the mid-seventies. In Quine’s mind, this con-
sequence was not really harmful, because he believed that instead of 
ontology, the burden of explanatory power should shift to ideology. 
Not objects, but the predicates were to become most important. How-
ever, as will be shown in the fourth section, this step has consequences 
Quine would rather not have. If one takes Quine’s tenet of extension-
alism really serious, one can equally obtain an ideological debacle in 
addition to Quine’s ontological debacle. In the last section, I will assess 
some remedies, and conclude that the role of extensionalism in 
Quine’s philosophy is under pressure. 
Throughout the paper, I will be as faithful to Quine’s ideas as pos-
sible. Though one might find some Quinean tenets, implausible from 
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the start, I will take Quine’s philosophical starting points for granted 
without further defence. The critique here presented is an internal 
one. I develop an argument in a Quinean style on the basis of some of 
Quine’s basic tenets, so to conclude that this leads to a most irksome 
situation. 
 
 
2. Ontological Relativity 
 
In Word and Object Quine hit upon ontological relativity or inscruta-
bility of reference. In order to substantiate his thesis of the indetermi-
nacy of translation, Quine works out a case of radical translation. He 
pictures the scene of a field linguist accompanied by a native speaker 
of some foreign tribe, whose language has not yet been studied. A rab-
bit scurries by, and the native utters “Gavagai.” The linguist ventures 
the translation “Rabbit,” or “Lo, a rabbit.” Quine is convinced that it 
may well be the case that the alleged general term “gavagai” is not co-
extensional with the general term “rabbit.” Quine gives a list of objects 
that could be meant by the term “gavagai”: “mere stages, or temporal 
segments, of rabbits”; or “sundry undetached parts of rabbits”; or “the 
continuous portion of the spatio-temporal world that consists of rab-
bits.” We can also take it as “a singular term naming a recurring uni-
versal, rabbithood.” (Quine 1960, pp. 51–52) 
The reason why the extensions of general terms cannot be deter-
mined is because the notion term is not well defined. In radical trans-
lation, we have only the scenery and the linguistic behaviour at our 
disposal. The criterion of ontological commitment of the foreign lan-
guage is unknown. The criterion is related to the syntax of the lan-
guage. It is however not clear how to relate the English criterion of on-
tological commitment, namely to be is to be the value of a pronoun, 
(Quine 1995, p. 29) or the logical criterion of ontological commit-
ment, namely to be is to be the value of a variable, (Quine 1939, p. 
708; 1953, p. 15) to the syntax of the foreign language:  
 
We cannot even say what native locutions to count as analogues of 
terms as we know them, much less equate them with ours term for 
term, except as we have also decided what native devices to view as 
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doing in their devious ways the work of our own various auxiliaries to 
objective reference: our particles and pronouns, our singular and plu-
ral, our copula, our identity predicate. The whole apparatus is interde-
pendent, and the very notion of term is as provincial to our culture as 
are those associated devices. The native may achieve the same net ef-
fects through linguistic structures so different that any eventual con-
struing of our devices in the native language and vice versa can prove 
unnatural and largely arbitrary. (Quine 1960, p. 53) 
 
The argument for inscrutability on the basis of the indeterminacy of 
translation may be summarised as follows. Since the thesis of the inde-
terminacy of translation states that there are various equally accept-
able, but incompatible manuals of translation from our language to a 
foreign language, we can translate the foreign language in different 
ways to our own. Each of the translations will relate different phrases 
with our apparatus of individuation. Different translations may involve 
different subsets of the English lexicon of predicates. The analogue of 
Tarski’s paradigm may be applied to the different translations of the 
foreign language, but will yield different ontologies for different manu-
als of translation.  
In later years this first argument for ontological relativity based on 
the indeterminacy of translation did no longer appear in Quine’s work. 
Inscrutability of reference is now explained solely by means of the so-
called proxy function argument. Proxy functions appear for the first 
time in in Quine’s lecture “Ontological reduction and the world of 
numbers,” which does not deal with ontological relativity but with on-
tological reduction. Proxy functions are a part of the explanation of 
ontological reduction. Quine clarifies his account of ontological reduc-
tion by means of Carnap’s reduction of impure numbers to natural 
numbers. Impure numbers are measures, such as degrees-Centigrade. 
In the sentence “The temperature of x is n°C,” the term “n°C” is an 
impure number. The impure numbers can be reduced to natural num-
bers if we take n instead of n°C. (Quine 1964, p. 213) 
Ontological reductions satisfy three conditions. First, the truth-
values of the sentences remain the same after an ontological reduc-
tion. Second, all the predicates that denote the unreduced entities 
must be reinterpreted adequately. Third, a mapping between the un-
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reduced entities and the reduced entities can be specified, and here we 
get the definition of a proxy function: 
 
This third condition is that we be able to specify what I shall call a 
proxy function: a function which assigns one of the new things, in this 
example a pure number, to each of the old things – each of the impure 
numbers of temperature. In this example the proxy function is the 
function “how many degrees centigrade” – the function f such that 
f(n°C) = n. It is not required that such a function be expressible in the 
original theory  to which ‘H’ [‘the temperature of x is ’] belonged, 
much less that it be available in the final theory ’ to which ‘Hc’ [‘the 
temperature of x is n°C’] belongs. It is required rather of us, out in the 
metatheory where we are explaining and justifying the discontinuance 
of  in favor of ’, that we have some means of expressing a proxy 
function. Only upon us, who explain ‘H(x, )’ away by ‘Hc(x, n)’, does 
it devolve to show how every  that was intended in the old  deter-
mines an n of the new ’. (Quine 1976b, pp. 217–218) 
 
This characterisation of a proxy function is retained in all of 
Quine’s further writings.3  
Quine has later used proxy functions, which were initially meant to 
restrain ontological reductions, to illustrate the inscrutability of refer-
ence. The argument is quite simple given the definition of a proxy 
function. The only difference with proxy functions used in ontological 
reduction is that they are one-to-one.4 To prove the inscrutability one 
starts with an interpreted theory. This interpretation consists of a list 
of predicates, a domain of objects, and assigns subsets of the ontology 
to each predicate of the lexicon. If a one-to-one proxy function is 
given, the theory may be reinterpreted by taking the ontology of prox-
ies and assigning to each predicate the proxies of the elements that be-
longed to the extension of predicate under the initial interpretation. It 
is clear that such a reinterpretation of the theory leaves all the truth-
values of its sentences unchanged. The lesson Quine draws from this is 
that it does not matter whether the initial interpretation or one of its 
myriad reinterpretations is countenanced. The reference of the lan-
guage or theory goes inscrutable.  
This proxy function argument stems from Quine’s background in 
logic and mathematics. Quine’s initial examples of proxy functions are 
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mathematical. The ubiquitous example is the case of Gödel-
numbering. For every expression there is a Gödel number, and all 
predicates denoting expressions may be reinterpreted as denoting 
Gödel numbers:  
 
Thus suppose we take fx as the Gödel number of x, and as our old sys-
tem we take a syntactical system in which one of the predicates is “is a 
segment of.” The corresponding predicate of the new or numerical sys-
tem, then, would be one which amounts, so far as its extension is con-
cerned, to the words, “is the Gödel number of a segment of that whose 
Gödel number is.” The numerical predicate would not be given this 
devious form, of course, but would be rendered as an appropriate 
purely arithmetical condition. (Quine 1969, p. 57) 
 
Quine also gave various other examples of proxy functions, some of 
them more credible than others. Another mathematical example is to 
supplant each class by its logical complement, leaving individuals 
aside. The proxy-function is one-to-one, and the predicate of member-
ship is reinterpreted as nonmembership. (Quine 1981, p. 16; 1995, p. 
73) Other examples are “is a place-time of,” (1981, p. 19) or “is the 
cosmic complement of.” (1995, p. 72) 
As a result of the inscrutability of reference, Quine’s views on on-
tology have radically changed. Quine’s strong interest in ontology was 
mitigated to a brand of structuralism.5 Ontology became the study of 
structures in which individuation is possible. Objects are envisaged as 
nodes or places in a structure. The difference between places and 
placeholders is blurred by the inscrutability of reference. Quine has 
baptised his position “global structuralism” in “Structure and nature:”  
 
The point is that if we transform the range of objects of our science in 
any one-to-one fashion, by reinterpreting our terms and predicates as 
applying to the new objects instead of the old ones, the entire eviden-
tial support of our science will remain undisturbed. … The conclusion 
is that there can be no evidence for one ontology as over against an-
other, so long anyway as we can express a one-to-one correlation be-
tween them. Save the structure and you save all. (Quine 1992, p. 8) 
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3. An Ontological Debacle 
 
The use of the proxy function argument gave a fatal blow to Quine’s 
initial ontological project. One of the best illustrations is a scenario 
Quine sketched in the mid-seventies, which he called an ontological 
debacle. In the papers “Whither physical objects”? (1976b) and “Facts 
of the matter” (1979) Quine uses proxy functions to reduce physical 
objects to sets. Physical objects, and sets of them, and sets of sets of 
them constitute the whole ontology of the world. No other objects ex-
ist. Quine then characterises physical objects as follows: 
 
Consider my broad conception of a physical object: the material con-
tent of any portion of space-time, however scattered and discontinu-
ous. Equivalently: any sum or aggregate of point-events. The world’s 
water is for me a physical object, comprising all the molecules of H2O 
anywhere ever. There is a physical object part of which is a momentary 
stage of a silver dollar now in my pocket and the rest of which is a 
temporal segment of the Eiffel Tower through its third decade. (Quine 
1981, p. 124) 
 
Quine’s definition of physical objects is a mereological one. Now, 
using the proxy function argument, it is possible to take the space-time 
regions instead of their contents, and reinterpret the predicates ac-
cordingly. We thus end up with a physical ontology of space-time re-
gions. As well-known, space-time regions can be described by means of 
coordinates. It is thus possible to have a one-to-one relation between 
physical objects and the sets of quadruples of reals, which can be used 
as a proxy function. We end up with an ontology of sets of quadruples 
of real numbers. A further proxy function may be used to reduce real 
numbers to sets of natural numbers by means of Dedekind cuts. By 
means of a further proxy function, based on Zermelo’s or von Neu-
mann’s way of reducing natural numbers to pure sets, one can use pure 
sets instead of natural numbers. The result is that the ontology of 
physical objects becomes inscrutable and that we end up with pure set 
theory.6 In the two mentioned papers, Quine called this form of hyper-
Pythagoreanism an “ontological débacle.” Physics lost it ontology, and 
had to proceed with set theory only.  
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Quine had of course to find some way to save physics or science in 
general, and he took recourse to ideology. He hoped ideology could 
take over the crucial role of ontology in science: 
 
We must note that this triumph of hyper-Pythagoreanism has to do 
with the values of the variables of quantification, and not with what 
we say about them. It has to do with ontology and not with ideology. 
The things that a theory deems there to be are the values of the the-
ory’s variables, and it is these that have been resolving themselves into 
numbers and kindred objects - ultimately into pure sets. The ontology 
of our system of the world reduces thus to the ontology of set theory, 
but our system of the world does not reduce to set theory; for our lexi-
con of predicates and functors still stands stubbornly apart … We 
might most naturally react to this state of affairs by attaching less im-
portance to mere ontological considerations than we used to do. We 
might come to look to pure mathematics as the locus of ontology for a 
matter of course, and consider that lexicon of natural science, not the 
ontology, is where the metaphysical action is. (Quine 1976b, p. 503) 
 
This ontological debacle is one of the major reasons why Quine's 
interest in ontology has withered. However, from a metaphysical, or 
rather epistemological view - ontology was considered a handmaiden 
of epistemology - nothing had really changed according to Quine. If 
we want to discuss our knowledge of the world, expressed in our scien-
tific theories, we should not look at the objects they describe, but at 
the ideas expressed in them through the predicates by means of which 
the (scientific) language is regimented. Quine was confident that this 
did not bring along new problems. In the next section, it will be argued 
that there is every reason for grave concern. 
 
 
4. An Ideological Debacle 
 
It is important to note that the proxy function argument has also af-
fected Quine’s ideology. Ontology and ideology go hand in hand, since 
the objects, the members of an ontology, are the objects denoted by 
the predicates.7 The predicates form the ideology of a theory. Shaking 
the ontology will have reverberations in the ideology. A proxy func-
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tion clearly invokes a change in the ideology. A reshuffling of the on-
tology invokes a reinterpretation of the ideology. If we commit our-
selves to natural numbers instead of to impure numbers, then this will 
involve a reinterpretation of the predicate “the temperature of x is 
n°C.” In fact, this is all the change there will be. If instead of dogs we 
consider place-times of a dog, then the predicate “is a dog” becomes “is 
the lifelong filament of space-time taken up by a dog.”8 Going proxy 
only involves a change in ontology and ideology, while the rest, the 
sentences and their truth-values remain untouched: 
 
There has been a revision of ontology on the one hand and of ideol-
ogy, so to say, on the other; they go together. Yet verbal behavior pro-
ceeds undisturbed, warranted by the same observations as before and 
elicited by the same observations. Nothing really has changed. (Quine 
1981, p. 19) 
 
The use of proxy functions has eventually shifted the explanatory 
force of theories from ontology to ideology.  
The result of the shift of ontology to ideology is that predicates are 
rather taken as expressing notions than classes. The physical predi-
cates of course have an extension, but in addition they carry meaning 
or are informative. Quine gives the following example: 
 
Thus consider, for a homely example, the ascription of temperature. 
What admits of a temperature is not a point, strictly speaking, but a 
small spatiotemporal region. A dyadic predicate is called for, predica-
ble of a number and a set of quadruples of numbers: thus ‘Fx’, mean-
ing that the mean temperature in degrees Kelvin of the region whose 
coordinates comprise the set  is x. The notion of temperature and its 
scale of measurement are compacted in the monolithic predicate ‘F’. 
The business of objective reference now devolves upon the mathe-
matical variables ‘x’ and ‘’, whose values are pure numbers and sets of 
quadruples of reals. (Quine 1976b, p. 501) 
 
If physics has to be informative, a lot of information must be com-
pacted in the predicate ‘F’. The notion of temperature involves cer-
tainly more than couples of quadruples of reals and reals. This seems 
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irreconcilable with the rest of Quine’s philosophy, and more especially 
with his extensionality thesis.  
It is not clear how to individuate the (semantic function of the) 
predicates.9 The only nonintensional way of characterising predicates 
is by giving their extension. This extension is a class of objects. It is 
obvious from the presentation hitherto that ontology can be reduced 
to an ontology of pure sets only. The ideology can be reinterpreted 
suitably. For the sake of the argument, we will suppose that ontology 
and ideology have been so reinterpreted. Thus the extension of any 
predicate consists of pure sets only. This implies that set-theoretic 
predicates, picking out the required extensions for our theory, are all 
we need. We no longer need predicates from special sciences such as 
physics or biology, if we have for each predicate in these sciences an-
other predicate in set theory that picks out the same extension. If we 
have a predicate, say ‘F’, determining the temperature of a part of 
space-time in a measurement system, then this predicate may deter-
mine the same extension, the same class of pure sets, as another predi-
cate ‘G’, that is only used in set theory. If two predicates determine the 
same extension, then they are interchangeable salva veritate. We can 
always use the set-theoretic predicate ‘G’ instead of the physical predi-
cate ‘F’. In this way we can eliminate all the predicates from special 
sciences in favour of predicates from set theory. Together with an on-
tological debacle there is an ideological debacle. The proxy function 
argument allows us to eliminate all physical objects in favour of sets, 
and the extensionality thesis allows us to eliminate all physical predi-
cates in favour of set-theoretic predicates. No predicates, but the 
predicates having as extension pure sets, are necessary. Our theories of 
the world, both their ontology and ideology, have collapsed to pure set 
theory.  
Let me give another example that may clarify what I mean by an 
ideological debacle. We may have a special science, say geography, in 
which we have a predicate ‘F’, “is a point on the surface of the Earth.” 
We have reinterpreted our science so that we have an ontology of 
numbers; for the sake of brevity I will not use sets. For this reinterpre-
tation I have chosen the centre of the Earth as the central point of our 
reference system with the ordinary scale. This means that the exten-
sion of the predicate ‘F’ is the extension of a predicate ‘G’, namely “is a 
Principia 8 (1), Florianópolis, June 2004, pp. 85–102. 
Quine’s Ideological Debacle 95
quadruple of real numbers, with the sum of the squares of the first 
three numbers equal to the square of 6700,” 6700 being the radius of 
the Earth in kilometres. This is just the mathematical expression of be-
ing a point on a sphere with radius 6700 km, with a dummy parameter 
for the time coordinate. The extension of both predicates is just the 
same set of quadruples of real numbers. Throughout geography, if ge-
ography is a good, i.e. extensional, science, we can replace the predi-
cate “is a point on the surface of the Earth” by its mathematical coun-
terpart. Along these lines we could eliminate the complete geographi-
cal lexicon. The ideology of geography is reduced to the ideology of 
mathematics. One can easily imagine that this could be done for all 
the predicates in science, or at least for a crucial part of the lexicon. 
Quine was aware of the threat of an ideological debacle, a collapse 
of ideology to mathematics:  
 
The polysyllabic functor last cited is characteristic: ‘temperature in de-
grees centigrade of the region whose coordinates are’. Let me abbrevi-
ate it as ‘f’. It relates pure sets; we have ‘f = x’ where  is a set of 
quadruples of numbers and x is a number. But there is no hope nor fear 
nor thought of translating this ‘f’ itself into the notation purely of set 
theory: into the ‘’ of membership and the symbols of logic. The rela-
tion of the coordinates of a place to the centigrade temperature is in-
deed a relation of numbers, a relation of sets, but it is presumably not 
an arithmetical relation, not a set-theoretic relation. By an extraordi-
nary coincidence and a stretch of the imagination it could be, indeed: 
there may be some complex formula in the notation of pure arithmetic 
or set theory that just happens to pair the coordinates of all places cor-
rectly with their temperatures, throughout space-time. But we have no 
inkling of it - no inkling of a mathematical formula fixing the tempera-
tures everywhere through all eternity. (Quine 1976b, p. 503) 
 
Quine seems quite confident that the collapse of ideology to 
mathematical or set-theoretic ontology is not likely to happen, or at 
least, we have no inkling of such a collapse. However, the passage not 
convincing and deserves further reflection.  
Quine’s reassurance notwithstanding, there is ample reason to fear 
this ideological debacle. If one looks at the actual practice of contem-
porary physics, the predicates that are used are without exception 
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mathematical functions. This means that it cannot be an ‘extraordi-
nary coincidence’ that one could describe physical predicates by means 
of complex formulas in pure arithmetic. In all physical handbooks, 
temperature appears as a mathematical function. Without the possibil-
ity of treating temperature as a mathematical object, thermodynamics 
is precluded. Temperature occurs essentially in its basic differential 
equations. Without counting temperature as a mathematical object, a 
solution of differential equations, thermodynamics is jeopardised.10 
Rather than saying that we have no inkling of an ideological deba-
cle, we should say that especially in theoretical physics, there is no es-
cape from it. Not only temperature, but most predicates in theoretical 
physics are thus on the verge of collapse to set-theoretic predicates. 
Mass, spin, momentum, acceleration, force, luminosity, etc. all appear 
in mathematical equations. Not only in physics this is the case, but 
also in other mathematised branches of science, such as chemistry, 
population genetics, or economics. Interest rate, inflation, etc. are 
predicates that appear in mathematical equations in economics.  
It is to some extent debatable how far this procedure can be ex-
tended. It is not entirely clear that one could really replace all the 
predicates in our scientific web of belief by set-theoretical co-
extensional predicates. One may rightfully doubt whether some predi-
cates in biology, sociology, etc. can really replaced by means of 
mathematical expressions. Nevertheless, this does not really weaken 
the impact of the ideological debacle. Because, even if certain domains 
of science would be unscathed, still major damage would be done to 
very central scientific disciplines. It is not clear how to avoid the ideo-
logical debacle in physics, for Quine probably the most eminent scien-
tific discipline. It could hardly be imagined that Quine would be eager 
to tolerate an ideological debacle, even if it were restricted to physics 
only. In sum, there is every reason to take the scenario of an ideologi-
cal debacle very serious.  
 
 
5. Extensionalism 
  
The ideological debacle here presented poses a serious problem for 
Quine’s philosophy. It is obtained by combining some very elementary 
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tenets from his philosophical framework, namely the proxy function 
argument and extensionalism. The combination of these two tenets 
leads to the collapse of the whole of science, or at least very important 
parts of it, to pure set theory. More disconcertingly, there are no 
straightforward remedies. In view of the ontological debacle, Quine 
had already taken very drastic measures by renouncing the central role 
he previously attributed to ontology. But in view of the ideological de-
bacle, even more far-reaching measures are called for.  
 As a first attempt to avoid the problem, one could reject the thesis 
of ontological relativity. But as Quine has realised over a few dec-
ades,11 ontological relativity is a very natural outcome of his logical 
and ontological framework. One can only avoid ontological relativity 
by giving up the entire Quinean ontological framework. This is proba-
bly the least attractive option for Quine.  
A second remedy would be to limit the scope of the ontological 
framework, by restricting the role of the logical framework. Regiment-
ing science in first order logic, according to Quine a necessary condi-
tion for austere science, leads to ontological relativity. One could thus 
question the use of logical regimentation in science. At first glance, 
this is not really counterintuitive. On the contrary, it is rather unlikely 
that one could reformulate disciplines such as biology, sociology or his-
tory in first order logic. Even for physics, one may doubt that regimen-
tation is useful. There is seldom any need to ‘regiment’ physics to a 
first-order language, and to sort out a list of physical predicates. A su-
perficial glance at some textbooks or articles of theoretical physics, or 
other sciences, will reveal that logical formulations hardly occur. The 
scope of the ontological framework would thus be restricted to 
mathematics or set theory. After all, the framework was first developed 
in response to technical difficulties in set theory (Decock 2004). Still, 
this way out would be a very radical departure from Quine’s philoso-
phy.12  
A third and seemingly less radical departure, would be to block the 
substitutions that lead to problems. If one is not allowed to replace a 
predicate with a co-extensional predicate in the scientific framework, 
or if this is not allowed for a certain class of predicates, then the ideo-
logical debacle would be avoided. However, for Quine still would still 
be a very disheartening solution, as extensionalism would be rejected.13 
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Nevertheless, from the passages quoted, this must be the way Quine 
should be prepared to go. He shifts the burden from ontology to ideol-
ogy, and thus predicates become more important.  
There are many passages in Quine’s work where he discusses the 
semantic role of predicates. These can be ‘meaningful without a mean-
ing’. (see e.g. Quine 1953, p. 11) Quine does not want meanings (or 
any intensions) in his philosophy, because there is no criterion of iden-
tity that allows for identification of meanings. However, predicates can 
be used in a semantic way, as meaningful expressions. Quine even ad-
mits that different expressions may not be synonymous, though they 
are co-extensional e.g. “creatures with kidneys” and “creatures with a 
heart.” (see Quine 1953, p. 21; 1970, pp. 8–9; 1987, p. 22) On the 
other hand, the synonymy relation and meanings are not be taken se-
rious from a scientific point of view for lack of austerity. As a result, 
the semantic role of predicates in Quine’s philosophy is rather unclear. 
The fact that predicates are to some extent dubious or murky 
would not be harmful, it not for their pivotal role in Quine’s philoso-
phical framework. As a result of the ontological debacle, Quine has to 
rely heavily on the ideology of science. Moreover, as the ideological 
debacle points out, the semantical role of predicates is crucial for their 
use in science, i.e. it is not sufficient to look at their extensions only. 
The natural conclusion would be that one has to accept that the 
meanings of predicates cannot easily be dismissed, and must be ac-
counted for. One cannot on the one hand rely on the meanings of 
predicates ‘where the metaphysical action is’ and at the same time 
deny that these meanings exist in some way. The most reasonable so-
lution for the ideological debacle would be to accept that predicates 
are to be used in an intensional way, i.e. the predicates cannot be sub-
stituted for one another salva veritate, and without loss of meaning. 
The ontological and ideological debacle thus undermine Quine’s thesis 
of extensionality.14  
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Resumo 
 
Em dois artigos em meados dos anos 70s, Quine discutiu um desastre onto-
lógico, a redução da ontologia a uma pura ontologia de conjuntos. Esse de-
sastre, que enfraqueceu o interesse de Quine pela ontologia, é o resultado 
natural da relatividade ontológica, ou, mais precisamente, do argumento das 
funções vicárias. Explica-se por que Quine chegou a essa conclusão inevitá-
vel. Além disso, argumenta-se que o resultado é ainda mais danoso para a 
filosofia de Quine do que se presumiu até aqui. Mostra-se que, além do de-
sastre ontológico, há um desastre ideológico, reduzindo a ideologia (léxico) 
da ciência a uma ideologia de teoria de conjuntos. O desastre ideológico re-
sulta da aplicação de substituições extensionais de predicados dentro de uma 
teoria científica, que é reinterpretada por meio de funções vicárias como 
uma teoria com uma ontologia da teoria de conjuntos. Embora Quine tenha 
reconhecido a possibilidade de tal desastre ideológico, sua resposta não é 
convincente. Como resultado disso, sua tese extensionalista fica sob forte 
pressão.  
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Notes 
 
 
1 In Burgess and Rosen 1997, and Shapiro 1997, the term ‘ideology’ is used in 
a Quinean sense. However, Shapiro’s account slightly deviated from Quine’s 
use, as also modal concepts belong to the ideology, see Shapiro 1997, p. 218.  
2 For an elaborate account of this interplay, see Decock 2002. 
3 In the quotation, a ‘metatheory’ is mentioned. In order to carry out the on-
tological reduction (or to use the proxy function argument for ontological 
relativity), one needs a level to contemplate both the unreduced and the re-
duced theory (or the intial and reinterpreted theory). It would seem that an 
encompassing theory and an overall ontology is needed in order to use proxy 
functions. Strictly speaking, this would mean that one is not reducing (or re-
interpreting) a theory, but that one is extending it. Quine was aware of this 
problem. He said that the proxy function “suffers from a conspicuous element 
of make-believe” (1964, p. 219). Later, he regarded the argument as a reductio 
ad absurdum (1969, p. 58); the encompassing universe is only countenanced 
for the sake of the argument. I will not elaborate the possible problems here 
involved. 
4 In the first article (1964, p. 220), Quine explicitly rejects one-to-one proxy 
functions, and opts for many-one functions. 
5 Already in Quine 1964 (p. 220), proxy functions were related to structural-
ism. Quine mentions Goodman’s use of them to obtain some form of structur-
alism. 
6 The reductions from real numbers to pure sets are elaborated in Set Theory 
and its Logic. This work is further interesting in relation to this paper, because 
it makes clear how Quine’s ontological reflections make perfect sense in a 
mathematical context. Even if one neglects the real material world, and only 
concentrates on the mathematical universe, ontological questions are still 
fruitful and inevitable. Far more than usual in contemporary set theory, 
Quine is very meticulous about ontological commitments, i.e. abstraction 
principles. In Decock 2004, I have argued that specific technical problems in 
set theory triggered Quine’s interest in ontology.  
7 Quine argues that this is equivalent to the criterion of ontological commit-
ment ‘to be is to be the value of a variable’. He reformulates this as “[T]o be 
is to be denoted by a one-place predicate.” (1995, p. 35) 
8 A similar problem as in footnote 3 arises. One has to be able to discuss the 
reinterpretation from an overall point of view, comprising both interpreta-
tions. Quine can state that after the reinterpretation the phrase “is a dog” is 
still used, since the phrase “is the lifelong filament of space-time taken up by a 
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dog” is only the meaning of “is a dog” in the reinterpreted language as ex-
pressed in the initial language. 
9 Strictly speaking, from an ontological point of view, predicates are linguistic 
expressions and thus identifiable by means of spelling as strings of phonemes 
or strings of letters. For a longer discussion and references, see Decock 2002, 
section 2.4. 
10 As a rejoinder, it might be argued that physics does not describe reality as it 
is, but is only able to yield local approximations. Quine seemingly employs 
this line of reasoning when he says that there is probably no “mathematical 
formula fixing the temperatures everywhere through all eternity.” However, 
this seems at odds with Quine’s naturalism. With the metaphor of Neurath’s 
ship that is permanently rebuilt at sea, Quine put forward the view that we 
always look at science from the inside. The view that there is an external real-
ity that we can never grasp is incompatible with this immanentism. The tem-
perature predicate must be encompassed within the scientific framework, i.e. 
within thermodynamics. In view of the smoothness of these equations, there 
is no reason to believe that the total temperature distribution would be so ir-
regular that it cannot be described by means of mathematical functions.  
11 Quine’s thesis of ontological relativity was formulated in Quine 1969, and 
was presented as the John Dewey Lectures in March 1968. Quine’s first publi-
cation on ontology was the text “Designation and Existence” from 1939. 
12 In Decock 2002, section 7.1, I assess the use of Quine’s logical framework 
for ontological question, and suggest that this option may be necessary. 
13 Extensionalism is one of the most central tenets in Quine’s philosophy. In 
an interview with Fara (1994), he named extensionalism and naturalism as 
the two central tenets of his philosophy. His critique on Carnap’s intensional 
modal systems was crucial for the development of American philosophy, he 
never accepted Kripke’s models for modal logic, and even in his latest writ-
ings, he defended extensionalism (e.g. 1994). 
14
 I thank Leon Horsten, Jaap van Brakel, and Paul Gochet for comments on 
an early version of this paper, Oswaldo Chateaubriand, Paul Gregory, Dirk 
Greimann, Matthew McKeon, Martin Montminy, Sofia Stein, and Vera Vidal 
for useful comments at the Principia Conference, and Arianna Betti for com-
ments on the final text. 
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